Subsidiarity and the European Convention on Human Rights by Mowbray, Alastair
1 
 
Subsidiarity and the European Convention on Human Rights 
Alastair Mowbray, Professor of Public Law, University of Nottingham 
Abstract 
Theoretical views on the concept of subsidiarity are examined followed by an analysis of 
the origins of the principle of subsidiarity within the ECHR. The Court’s utilisation of the 
principle, as disclosed by the jurisprudence, is studied across three time periods 
encompassing the original part-time Court, the first decade of the full-time Court and the 
post-Interlaken era. This is supplemented by a consideration of some quantitative data, 
derived from the Court’s HUDOC database, on the usage of subsidiarity in the case 
reports of Court judgments. Particular attention is given to Grand Chamber judgments 
since 2010. Overall conclusions are then drawn on, inter alia, whether the Court’s use of 
the principle has altered over time, whether the principle is simply a device to limit the 
authority of the Court, who can benefit from the application of the principle and what 
links may be made between the theoretical writings and the actual judgments delivered  
at Strasbourg. 
 
As is well known the principle of subsidiarity has gained an increasingly high profile in 
the ongoing reform process of the European Convention on Human Rights1 (hereinafter 
“the Convention” or “the ECHR”) during recent years culminating in Protocol 152 adding 
a reference to the principle at the end of the Preamble of the Convention.3 Indeed, a 
serving judge at the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Court”) has 
extra-judicially described the current era as the “Age of Subsidiarity”.4 Therefore, now is 
an opportune time to stand back and examine the conceptual origins of the principle and 
its emergence within the ECHR system. How has the Court been using the principle and 
has that changed over the decades of the Court’s evolution from a part-time 
adjudicatory body with a limited jurisdiction to the main institution responsible for 
applying and interpreting the Convention at the international level?5 
The conceptual nature and history of subsidiarity 
Carozza has provided a working definition of subsidiarity in the following terms, 
“subsidiarity is the principle that each social and political group should help smaller or 
more local ones accomplish their respective ends without, however, arrogating those 
                                                          
1
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS No. 005, Rome 4
th
 
November 1950. 
 
2
 Protocol No. 15 amending the  Convention for the  Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
CETS No. 213, Strasbourg 24
th
 June 2013.  
 
3
 See A. Mowbray, “European Court of Human Rights: May 2013-April 2014,  20(4) Eur. Pub. L. 579 (2014). 
 
4
 R. Spano, “Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity”, 14(3) H.R.L.R. 
487 (2014). 
 
5
 On the historical development of the Convention see, E. Bates, The Evolution of the ECHR, (Oxford: OUP, 
2010). 
 
2 
 
tasks to itself.”6 He explained that its origins went back to the time of classical Greece 
and subsequently it was revived during the medieval period by Thomas Aquinas. In the 
seventeenth century Johannes Althusius applied subsidiarity as an aspect of his 
theoretical views regarding the role of a secular federal state. These were later 
developed by political theorists including Montesquieu, Locke, Tocqueville and Proudhon. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century Roman Catholic social theorists embraced the 
principle as a means of seeking to promote a socio-economic model that stood between 
the extremes of laissez-faire capitalism and Marxist proletarian rule. In 1891 Pope Leo 
XIII issued his social encyclical Rerum Novarum in which he advocated limited state 
intervention in economic relations to protect the basic interests of workers. “Whenever 
the general interest or any particular class suffers, or is threatened with harm, which can 
in no other way be met or prevented, the public authority must step in to deal with 
it…the principle being that the law must not undertake more, nor proceed further, than is 
required for the remedy of the evil or the removal of the mischief.”7 On the fortieth 
anniversary of the above encyclical Pope Pius XI issued his own encyclical Rerum 
Novarum (1931) with a greater emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity as a justification 
for limited state intervention. 
…Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by 
their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an 
injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign 
to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can 
do. …The supreme authority of the State ought, therefore, to let subordinate 
groups handle matters and concerns of lesser importance, which would otherwise 
dissipate its efforts greatly. …Therefore, those in power should be sure that the 
more perfectly a graduated order is kept among the various associations, in 
observance of the principle of “subsidiary function”, the stronger social authority 
and effectiveness will be [and] the happier and more prosperous the condition of 
the State.”8 
Carozza then notes how the principle was incorporated into the constitutional order of 
post-Second World War “West” Germany to distribute legal powers away from an 
overbearing central government system. Two decades later Ralph Dahrendorf, a German 
member of the European Commission, publicly argued for the application of the principle 
to reduce the bureaucratic powers of the European Economic Community (EEC) over 
agricultural policy. He advocated the Community should, “move away from the dogma of 
harmonization towards the principle of subsidiarity.”9 During the next twenty years the 
principle became increasingly prominent in the official discourse of the EEC and was 
formally incorporated in the text of the Treaty on European Union10. Article 2 stating 
that, “[t]he objectives of the Union shall be achieved as provided in this Treaty…while 
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respecting the principle of subsidiarity.” That obligation was elaborated in Article 5 which 
provided, “[i]n areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community 
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as 
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community.” 
Subsidiarity was incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty as a result of political forces 
according to Carozza in order to assuage concerns that European Community/Union 
institutions were becoming too centralised and powerful. 
 Follesdal, a Professor of Philosophy based in a human rights centre, has identified 
five different models of the principle of subsidiarity; which he defines as regulating “how 
to allocate or use authority within a political or legal order, typically in those orders that 
disperse authority between a centre and various member units.”11  First, the “liberty, 
Althusius” model based upon the ideas of the “father of federalism”, whom we have 
noted above. In this conception of subsidiarity, “[t]he role of the state is to co-ordinate 
and secure symbiosis among associations-on a consensual basis.”12 The second model, 
“liberty, confederalists”, is derived from American confederalists and their supporters, 
such as Montesquieu. “This view starts from the plausible assumptions that individuals 
should not be subjected to the arbitrary will of others in matters where no others are 
harmed, and that smaller groups are more likely to share preferences.”13 The third 
conceptual view is that of “efficiency, economic federalism” and “holds that powers and 
burdens of public goods should be placed with the populations that benefit from them.”14 
Follesdal considered that this model has wider aims that the Althusian theory as it seeks 
to elaborate standards for the distribution of powers. The former associates this model 
with advocates of sceptical views towards the accumulation of authority by the European 
Union. The fourth model is that of “justice, Catholic personalism” and embodies the 
Papal encyclicals discussed previously. The final model is the “liberal contractualist”, 
derived from theorists of this school, including John Rawls. At its heart, “[c]entral 
authorities should seek to support member units’ democratic and informed decision-
making, and they should also respect member units’ immunity against influence- as long 
as the decisions respect the best interests of its members and avoid local domination.”15 
Ultimately, Follesdal concludes that: 
“The” principle of subsidiarity cannot on its own provide legitimacy or contribute to 
a defensible allocation of authority between national and international institutions, 
e.g., regarding human rights law. Appeals to subsidiarity are too vague, and 
require attention to more items- including the standing of states, whether centre 
action is prohibited or required, and who should decide such issues. The more 
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plausible versions of subsidiarity insist that ultimately, these questions are 
answered in light of which arrangements benefit individual person’s interests better 
than the alternatives.”16 
So, turning to the more specific features of the ECHR system, we will now consider 
some of the thoughts of academics and judges on the nature and roles of the principle of 
subsidiarity within this jurisdiction. von Staden, an international organizations academic, 
sees “an element of subsidiarity” being integrated into the “institutional design”17 of the 
Court via the requirement that applicants exhaust domestic remedies prior to being 
eligible to lodge an application at Strasbourg.18 “This requirement gives expression not 
only to the duty of domestic institutions to try to remedy alleged human rights 
violations, but also to their right to do so in line with their domestic arrangements for 
resolving such disputes.”19  He also considers that the Court’s margin of appreciation 
doctrine can be viewed as an instrument of “normative subsidiarity”. The latter concept 
is elaborated as expressing “a preference for the lower level in order to protect values 
associated with governance at the lower level”.20 Professor Kuijer has also identified 
Article 13 of the ECHR, right to an effective remedy, as another source of subsidiarity 
within the Convention. “Article 13 is the embodiment of the principle of subsidiarity, 
which is one of the underlying foundations of the Convention mechanism.”21 
Professor de Londras, whilst contributing to the debate about what should be the 
dominant function of the Court22, argues that the “subsidiary nature” of the Court 
supports her belief that it should focus on a “constitutionalist function”23, which she 
defines as involving, inter alia, the judicial clarification and development of human rights 
standards24. However, she also identifies another form of subsidiarity within the ECHR 
system: 
When we speak of subsidiarity our tendency is to consider this as a relationship 
strictly between domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights, but for 
the Court to be secure and the Convention to be effective it also requires a level of 
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political subsidiarity between the Council of Europe’s political processes and the 
Court. This, as has already been argued, allows for systemic or endemic rights 
violations to be tackled as a political matter, particularly since the judgments of the 
Court already handed down in relation to those violations have not been executed 
fully or in a manner that in fact addresses the violations in question.25 
From this fascinating perspective the principle of subsidiarity does not simply encompass 
a bilateral relationship between the Court and domestic authorities (judicial and, I would 
submit, legislative and executive too), but also multilateral relationships between the 
Court and the political organs of the Council of Europe (namely, the Committee of 
Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly). 
 J-P Costa, the former President of the Court, has, like von Staden, identified the 
Convention’s requirement for applicants to exhaust domestic remedies before applying to 
the Court as enshrining the subsidiarity principle.26 In his view this “key provision” 
meant that the principle of subsidiarity did not need to be “restated” in the Preamble of 
the Convention “except for symbolic or political reasons”.27 His successor President 
Spielmann publicly observed that, “[t]he future imagined at Brighton is one where the 
centre of gravity of the Convention system can be lower than it is today, closer in time 
and space to all Europeans, and to all those under the protection of the Convention.”28 
We will be examining the Protocol reform process and its effects on the principle of 
subsidiarity in greater detail below. In his London lecture President Spielmann also 
praised the UK as “a model in terms of subsidiarity thanks to the Human Rights Act.”29 
 Judge Spano, responding to Lord Hoffmann’s criticisms of the Court30, explained 
his view that in recent years the Court has been developing “a more robust and coherent 
concept of subsidiarity.”31 Building upon cases such as the Grand Chamber’s judgment in 
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Hatton v UK32, he believes that, in respect of qualified rights under the ECHR33, the Court 
has paid particular attention to how the domestic authorities (especially parliaments) 
have sought to balance the conflicting interests when determining if a violation of the 
Convention has occurred.34 “With this qualitative, democracy-enhancing approach, the 
Court’s reformulation or refinement of the principle of subsidiarity, and the margin of 
appreciation, introduces a clear procedural dimension that can be examined on the basis 
of objective factors informed by the defendant government in its pleadings.”35 This 
methodology should contribute, according to Judge Spano, to alleviating any concerns 
that the Court has been engaging in “human rights imperialism”. 
 The above materials disclose the long history of the notion of subsidiarity as a 
construct, elaborated by both secular and religious figures, to govern the distribution of 
powers between different authorities. Given the centuries of gestation it is not surprising 
that different conceptual views of subsidiarity have been proclaimed by a variety of 
persons who have sought to utilise it across a diverse range of contexts, from delimiting 
the boundaries between state and church activities to allocating powers between national 
governments and regional supra-national organisations. Likewise within public debates 
about the ECHR system we have seen various academics and judges invoking the 
principle as an element in discussions on a broad canvass of issues from what should be 
the primary function of the Court to relations between national judges and their 
Strasbourg counter-parts. These papers have also provided us with valuable insights into 
the Convention origins of the principle. We are now going to deepen our understanding 
of this vital issue by examining the Court’s jurisprudence. 
The Legal Origins of the Principle of Subsidiarity within the ECHR 
The text of the Convention, subject to the amendment of the Preamble to be introduced 
under Protocol 15, contains no mention of the term subsidiarity. Indeed, in his 
pioneering examination of the principle during the era of the original Court, Petzold 
(Deputy Registrar of that Court) noted that, “it was not even referred to in the 
discussions leading up to the drafting and adoption of the Convention.”36 His explanation 
being that the drafters saw the ECHR as “a basic law” for an international organization 
(the Council of Europe) with intergovernmental aims, not including political integration. 
Therefore, we have to look to the Court’s case-law to discover the Convention 
foundations of the principle. 
 The Grand Chamber has in several judgments expressly identified Articles 1 
(obligation to respect human rights), 13 (right to an effective remedy) and 35(1) 
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(admissibility criteria) as the Convention bases for the principle of subsidiarity. In Kudla 
v Poland37 the Grand Chamber stated: 
By virtue of Article 1 (which provides: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of 
this Convention”), the primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing the 
guaranteed rights and freedoms is laid on the national authorities. The machinery 
of complaint to the Court is thus subsidiary to national systems safeguarding 
human rights. This subsidiary character is articulated in Articles 13 and 35 § 1 of 
the Convention. 
The purpose of Article 35 § 1, which sets out the rule on exhaustion of domestic 
remedies, is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or 
putting right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are 
submitted to the Court (see, as a recent authority, Selmouni  
v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 74, ECHR 1999-V). The rule in Article 35 § 1 is 
based on the assumption, reflected in Article 13 (with which it has a close affinity), 
that there is an effective domestic remedy available in respect of the alleged 
breach of an individual’s Convention rights (ibid.).38 
Subsequently in Cocchiarella v Italy39, another Grand Chamber, unanimously, confirmed 
that interpretation of the ECHR.40 Likewise in the more recent case of De Souza Ribeiro v 
France41, the Grand Chamber was united in confirming these three Articles as the textual 
foundation of the principle.42 As the Court has noted there is a logical connection 
between these Articles in the creation of the principle of subsidiarity. States party to the 
ECHR voluntarily bind themselves to guarantee the rights and freedoms specified in the 
Convention and to provide an effective domestic remedy to persons whose protected 
rights/freedoms have been infringed. Victims of such breaches will only be allowed to 
avail themselves of international redress before the Court if they have previously sought, 
unsuccessfully, to obtain a remedy before the relevant domestic authorities (normally via 
the national judicial system). We have already observed how former President Costa has 
identified Article 35(1) as being at the core of the Convention’s principle of subsidiarity.43 
 Article 19 of the ECHR (establishment of the Court) has also been held to provide 
a foundation for subsidiarity by the Grand Chamber in Austin and Others v UK44.  
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Subsidiarity is at the very basis of the Convention, stemming as it does from a 
joint reading of Articles 1 and 19. The Court must be cautious in taking on the role 
of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the 
circumstances of a particular case. As a general rule, where domestic proceedings 
have taken place, it is not the Court’s task to substitute its own assessment of the 
facts for that of the domestic courts and it is for the latter to establish the facts on 
the basis of the evidence before them. Though the Court is not bound by the 
findings of domestic courts and remains free to make its own appreciation in the 
light of all the material before it, in normal circumstances it requires cogent 
elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by the domestic 
courts…45 
Hence recognition of the Court’s inherent limitations as a fact-finding body, usually 
dealing with allegations about events having occurred many years previously, together 
with the primary responsibilities of domestic authorities to secure and provide redress for 
breaches of Convention rights/freedoms as elaborated above underpin this aspect of the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
The Court’s utilisation of the principle of subsidiarity 
We will now examine the different ways in which the Court has made use of the 
principle. As an important theme of our study is to determine if that usage has altered 
over time, especially during the contemporary period of heightened State emphasis on 
subsidiarity, we shall divide the jurisprudence into three eras. The first covers the 
original Court’s utilisation of subsidiarity. The second era encompasses the full-time 
Court’s usage between its’ coming into existence46 and the Interlaken 
Conference/Declaration47. The third era is the post-Interlaken period. 
(i) The Original Court’s usage 
Petzold has provided us with an innovative study of the original Court’s (and European 
Commission of Human Rights’) use of subsidiarity.48 He discovered that in one of its 
earliest judgments the Court referred to the principle when demarcating the 
responsibilities of Contracting States and the Court. In determining if a breach of Article 
14 (prohibition of discrimination) in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right to 
education) had occurred, the Plenary Court ruled that: 
In attempting to find out in a given case, whether or not there has been an 
arbitrary distinction, the Court cannot disregard those legal and factual features 
which characterise the life of the society in the State which, as a Contracting Party, 
has to answer for the measure in dispute. In so doing it cannot assume the rôle of 
the competent national authorities, for it would thereby lose sight of the subsidiary 
nature of the international machinery of collective enforcement established by the 
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Convention. The national authorities remain free to choose the measures which 
they consider appropriate in those matters which are governed by the Convention. 
Review by the Court concerns only the conformity of these measures with the 
requirements of the Convention.49 
This led Petzold to identify two elements in the use of subsidiarity by the ECHR system. 
A procedural aspect, which embodied the requirement for applicants to exhaust domestic 
remedies before lodging complaints at Strasbourg and a substantive limb.  The latter 
element was composed of three strands in the subsequent case-law where the original 
Court would limit its review of domestic authorities’ decisions in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity. First, the Court would not seek to supplant domestic courts’ 
primary role in delivering interpretations of national law.  “It is in no way the task of the 
European Court of Human Rights to take the place of the competent national courts in 
the interpretation of domestic law…”50 Secondly, where the Convention placed “a duty of 
specific conduct on the part of the competent national authority”.51 Petzold gave as an 
example the judgment in Wemhoff v Germany52, where the original Court left it up to the 
respondent State to provide the reasons justifying the applicant’s detention on remand 
when determining if there had been a breach of ECHR Article 5(3). Thirdly, through the 
Court’s creation of the margin of appreciation doctrine. 
This margin of appreciation thus stems directly from the principle of subsidiarity as 
it applies within the Convention system. Its basis is, according to the Court, the 
clear understanding that the Convention leaves to each Contracting State in the 
first place the task of securing within the domestic legal order the rights and 
freedoms which it enshrines: the Convention institutions make their own 
contribution to this task but they become involved only through contentious 
proceedings and once all domestic remedies have been exhausted. The doctrine of 
the margin of appreciation is a natural product of the principle of subsidiarity; it is 
a technique developed to allocate decision-making authority to the proper body in 
the Convention scheme, to delineate in concrete cases the boundary between 
“primary” national discretion and the “subsidiary” international supervision.53 
He identified Handyside v UK54, as a leading authority to support this proposition. 
Prophetically Petzold concluded by  observing that the principle of subsidiarity within the 
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ECHR system was not static but evolving. Therefore, we shall now examine how the 
“new” full-time Court embraced the principle. 
 
(ii) The full-time Court’s usage prior to Interlaken 
Under the Protocol 11 revised enforcement system the “new” Court absorbed the 
function of determining the admissibility of applications from the European 
Commission.55 However, the Court continued the Commission’s earlier approach of 
strictly applying the exhaustion of domestic remedies admissibility criterion. “The Court 
recalls that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35(1) of the 
Convention obliges applicants first to use the remedies that are normally available and 
sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for the breaches 
alleged.”56 Also, the full-time Court reaffirmed its predecessor’s view that States had the 
predominant duty of safeguarding Convention rights and freedoms. As the unanimous 
Grand Chamber stated in Christine Goodwin v UK, “[i]n accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, it is indeed primarily for the Contracting States to decide on the measures 
necessary to secure Convention rights within their jurisdiction”.57 But, dissenters in high 
profile cases sometimes criticised their majoritarian colleagues for ignoring the principle 
of subsidiarity. For example, in Ocalan v Turkey58, the Grand Chamber was divided on 
the issue of whether the applicant’s trial before a special national security court satisfied 
the requirement, under Article 6(1) of the ECHR, of being an independent and impartial 
tribunal. For the majority the presence, during the early stages of the trial, of a military 
judge undermined the independence of the trial. Whereas the President of the Court 
together with his successor and four other judges dissented as they believed that Turkey 
had complied with its Article 6(1) obligations by swiftly introducing constitutional 
changes removing military judges from national security courts following an adverse 
judgment by the Court in another case. 
Inherent in a system based on the principle of subsidiarity is loyal cooperation 
between a supranational judicial body, such as this Court, and the States which 
have adhered to the system. Imposing standards that are too high does not appear 
to us to be the best way of encouraging such cooperation or of expressing 
satisfaction to the States that provide it.59 
This observation vividly demonstrates that senior members of the full-time Court saw 
subsidiarity as a means of promoting State compliance and support for the Convention 
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by taking account of how a respondent State has reacted to previous judgments when 
determining if a breach has occurred in a later complaint. In Ocalan the dissenters were 
willing to overlook the initial membership of a military judge in the applicant’s trial as 
Turkey was in the process of implementing an earlier ruling by the Court and the 
dissenters wished to acknowledge that positive outcome. 
 The Grand Chamber also reaffirmed that ideally domestic courts, or other suitable 
judicial authorities, should determine the facts of disputed cases before an application is 
lodged at Strasbourg. “[I]n line with the principle of subsidiarity, it is best for the facts of 
cases to be investigated and issues to be resolved in so far as possible at the domestic 
level.”60 This was a clear recognition of the institutional, and budgetary, limitations of the 
Court as an international judicial supervisory mechanism and not a court of first instance 
hearing witnesses and determining evidential disputes. Of course, the Court has the 
power, under Article 38 of the ECHR, to conduct a fact-finding “investigation” if it 
determines such a procedure is necessary. However, as Professor Leach and his 
colleagues discovered the full-time Court had reduced the number of such investigations 
it launched (18) compared to the original Court and Commission (which had held them in 
74 cases). They concluded that saving “time and costs” were major considerations for 
the Court.61 We can see the resource implications for those, rare, cases where the Court 
invokes its fact-finding powers in the Grand Chamber’s determination of Ilascu and 
Others v Moldova and Russia62. In order to discover the nature and extent of the 
applicants’ (severe) mal-treatment by the self-proclaimed “Moldavian Republic of 
Transdniestria” authorities, supported by Russia, the Grand Chamber designated four of 
its judges as delegates who went and heard 43 witnesses, including the imprisoned 
applicants. Clearly it would have saved the Court these efforts if there had been a 
through and impartial domestic determination of the facts, but that was obviously not 
realistic in this contested and problematic region.63 So it is essential that the Court can 
have resort to its investigatory power in suitable cases. Generally, however, the principle 
of subsidiarity as applied to fact-finding relieves the Court of these onerous 
responsibilities. Thereby, revealing that the principle has benefits for both States and the 
Court. 
 The full-time Court announced a major change in its approach to Article 13 of the 
ECHR in Kudla v Poland64, relying heavily on the principle of subsidiarity to provide a 
jurisprudential justification for the new interpretation. The key issue was whether 
complainants alleging excessive delays in the domestic courts determinations of their 
“civil rights” or “criminal charges” against them, which if upheld would violate Article 
6(1) of the ECHR, were also able to invoke Article 13 to allege a separate breach of the 
right to an effective domestic remedy where there was no domestic mechanism to deal 
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with complaints of excessive delays in the national judicial system. The original Court 
had developed the practice of not examining Article 13 complaints in such cases where it 
had found a breach of the right to a judicial determination within a reasonable time 
enshrined in Article 6(1), on the basis that it was not necessary to also examine Article 
13.65 However, the Grand Chamber ruled that: 
In the Court’s view, the time has come to review its case-law in the light of the 
continuing accumulation of applications before it in which the only, or principal, 
allegation is that of a failure to ensure a hearing within a reasonable time in breach 
of Article 6 § 1. 
The growing frequency with which violations in this regard are being found has 
recently led the Court to draw attention to “the important danger” that exists for 
the rule of law within national legal orders when “excessive delays in the 
administration of justice” occur “in respect of which litigants have no domestic 
remedy” (see, for example, Bottazzi v. Italy [GC], no. 34884/97, § 22, ECHR 1999-
V…66 
The Grand Chamber considered that Article 13, based on the primary obligation of 
Contracting States to protect Convention rights within their own legal systems, 
reinforced States’ duties under Article 6. Furthermore: 
If Article 13 is, as the Government argued, to be interpreted as having no 
application to the right to a hearing within a reasonable time as safeguarded by 
Article 6 § 1, individuals will systematically be forced to refer to the Court in 
Strasbourg complaints that would otherwise, and in the Court’s opinion more 
appropriately, have to be addressed in the first place within the national legal 
system. In the long term the effective functioning, on both the national and 
international level, of the scheme of human rights protection set up by the 
Convention is liable to be weakened.67 
Consequently, subject to one dissent, the Grand Chamber determined that Article 13 
was also applicable to the applicant and had been violated as he did not have an 
effective remedy in Poland to challenge the excessive delay in the fraud case brought 
against him. 
 The judgment in Kudla represented a completed reversal of the original Court’s 
interpretation and application of Article 13, primarily motivated by the growing case-load 
crisis facing the new full-time Court.68 But the judgment vividly revealed how the Court 
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was able to utilise the principle of subsidiarity to underpin its new approach. So we see 
another situation where subsidiarity was of benefit to the Court in maximising the 
allocation of its precious resources, as States were placed under a clear Convention duty 
to establish effective domestic mechanisms to deal with complaints of excessive delays 
in national court proceedings. Sadly hindsight discloses that Kudla has not resolved the 
systemic problem of various States failing to operate efficient judicial systems.69 
 Another major development in the full-time Court’s response to complaints 
alleging a systematic failure in Contracting States to respect the Convention’s 
guarantees was the development of pilot judgments. In 2004 the Committee of 
Ministers, acting on a proposal from the Court, issued a Resolution encouraging the 
Court in judgments finding a breach of the ECHR to identify any “underlying systemic 
problem and the source of this problem, in particular when it is likely to give rise to 
numerous applications, so as to assist States in finding the appropriate solution and the 
Committee of Ministers in supervising the execution of judgments.”70 Whilst the Court 
has been cautious in delivering pilot judgments71, those that have been accorded this 
special designation have dealt with serious violations affecting many people, such as the 
defective rent control legislation which governed the relationships between about 
900,000 tenants and their 100,000 landlords in Hutten-Czapska v Poland72. In recent 
times the Court has acknowledged a connection between the pilot judgment procedure 
and the principle of subsidiarity. 
Another important aim of the pilot-judgment procedure is to allow the speediest 
possible redress to be granted at domestic level to the large numbers of people 
suffering from the general problem identified in the pilot judgment, thus 
implementing the principle of subsidiarity which underpins the Convention system 
(see Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), no. 33509/04, §§ 127 and 142, ECHR 2009, and 
Greens and M.T. v. the United Kingdom, nos. 60041/08 and 60054/08, § 108, 
ECHR 2010 (extracts)). It may thus be decided in the pilot judgment that the 
proceedings in all cases stemming from the same problem should be adjourned 
pending the implementation of the relevant measures by the respondent State.73 
So, again, we see in the different context of the pilot judgment process that subsidiarity 
has been invoked to underpin a new approach by the Court that is designed to help 
diverse participants in the Strasbourg complaints system, including successful 
complainants (and potential complainants) receiving swifter redress, respondent States 
and the Committee of Ministers gaining the insights of the Court on the nature of the 
systemic problem and the Court in being potentially relieved from having to determine 
numerous individual complaints generated by the identified systemic problem. 
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 Applicants raised the principle of subsidiarity to challenge the respondent 
government’s unusual strategies of seeking to raise a defence (arguably) not  asserted 
before the domestic courts and contesting the decision of their highest court in A and 
Others v UK74. The case involved the controversial response of the UK to the al’Qaeda 
attacks in America during September 2001. Within a few weeks of those attacks the 
British government introduced legislative proposals, enacted as the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001, and notified the Council of Europe of a derogation, made 
under Article 15 of the ECHR, regarding the Act’s powers concerning the detention of 
foreign nationals believed to pose a terrorist threat to the security of the UK. The 
applicants were detained under those powers, as they could not be deported to their 
home States due to a well- founded fear that they would be subjected to maltreatment, 
falling within Article 3 of the Convention, if returned to those countries.75 The applicants 
challenged their detention under the 2001 Act and eventually the House of Lords granted 
a quashing order regarding the derogation and issued a declaration of incompatibility, 
under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, in respect of the detention power 
contained in the 2001 Act.76 A majority of the House held those provisions were 
disproportionate and involved discrimination against foreign nationals. Nevertheless, 
most of the applicants continued to be held in detention. At Strasbourg the applicants 
claimed they were victims of breaches of several Convention Articles. Their complaints 
were relinquished, under ECHR Article 30, to the Grand Chamber. Before that body the 
government, inter alia, sought to defend the applicants’ detention as falling within the 
permissible ground that they were being held whilst action was being taken with a view 
to their deportation (authorised by Article 5(1)(f) of the Convention). In response the 
applicants submitted that, “it was abusive and contrary to the principle of subsidiarity for 
the Government to raise a novel argument before the Court and that they should be 
stopped from so doing.”77 The Grand Chamber, unanimously, ruled that: 
The Court is intended to be subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human 
rights. It is, therefore, appropriate that the national courts should initially have the 
opportunity to determine questions of the compatibility of domestic law with the 
Convention and that, if an application is nonetheless subsequently brought before 
the Court, it should have the benefit of the views of the national courts, as being in 
direct and continuous contact with the forces of their countries… It is thus of 
importance that the arguments put by the Government before the national courts 
should be on the same lines as those put before this Court. In particular, it is not 
open to a Government to put to the Court arguments which are inconsistent with 
the position they adopted before the national courts…78 
However, the Grand Chamber did not accept that the British government had infringed 
these limitations as it had addressed the relevance of Article 5 during the domestic 
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proceedings and most of the members of the House of Lords had expressly or implicitly 
examined whether the applicants’ detention was justified under the Article 5(1) 
exceptions. Regarding the applicants’ argument that the respondent government should 
not be permitted to dispute the House of Lords’ ruling that the British derogation was 
disproportionate because;  “it would be inconsistent with Article 19 and the principle of 
subsidiarity for the Court to be asked by a Government to review alleged errors of fact or 
law committed by that Government's own national courts.”79  The government 
responded that whilst they “accorded very great respect”80 to the House of Lords’ 
decision and the 2001 detention powers had been repealed, once the case had been 
brought before the Court the government believed that it was necessary to query the 
reasoning of the House. The Grand Chamber observed that: 
The present situation is, undoubtedly, unusual in that Governments do not 
normally resort to challenging, nor see any need to contest, decisions of their own 
highest courts before this Court. There is not, however, any prohibition on a 
Government making such a challenge, particularly if they consider that the national 
supreme court's ruling is problematic under the Convention and that further 
guidance is required from the Court.81 
Nevertheless, the Grand Chamber went on to demonstrate support for the House of 
Lords by holding that where a supreme court  had found a national derogation did not 
meet the requirements of ECHR Article 15, then the Court would be very reluctant to 
disagree with that determination. 
The object and purpose underlying the Convention, as set out in Article 1, is that 
the rights and freedoms should be secured by the Contracting State within its 
jurisdiction. It is fundamental to the machinery of protection established by the 
Convention that the national systems themselves provide redress for breaches of 
its provisions, with the Court exercising a supervisory role subject to the principle 
of subsidiarity (Z. and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 29392/95, § 103, ECHR 
2001-V). …where the highest domestic court has examined the issues relating to 
the State's derogation and concluded that there was a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation but that the measures taken in response were not 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, the Court considers that it would 
be justified in reaching a contrary conclusion only if satisfied that the national court 
had misinterpreted or misapplied Article 15 or the Court's jurisprudence under that 
Article or reached a conclusion which was manifestly unreasonable.82 
The Grand Chamber went on, unanimously, to concur with the House of Lords’ view that 
the British derogative was disproportionate (in its unjustified discrimination between 
foreign and national suspected terrorists) and that a number of the applicants had, inter 
alia, suffered violations of their right to liberty. 
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 The above judgment is of great significance in the full-time Court’s development 
of the principle of subsidiarity as it discloses the Strasbourg judges’ reaction to a 
respondent government seeking to utilise the Court as a de facto appellate tribunal in 
relation to a national supreme court. Such a scenario is rare because if an individual wins 
his/her Convention based challenge to state action before the highest national court that 
is normally the end of the process. It is only in the limited type of scenario, as in A and 
Others, that success before the highest national court does not provide an effective 
remedy that the individual will then take his/her case on to Strasbourg. In such a 
situation the Grand Chamber ruled that whilst the respondent State would not be 
allowed to raise arguments contrary to those it had deployed before the domestic courts, 
the State could seek to challenge the supreme court’s application of Convention 
jurisprudence. But as the Grand Chamber reasoning demonstrated the Court would be 
reluctant to disagree with a supreme court’s judgment that a breach of the Convention 
had occurred. By adopting that approach the Grand Chamber was firmly supporting 
national courts decision-making which was in accordance with Strasbourg case-law. 
 Another important facet of the judgment in A and Others concerned the role of 
the margin of appreciation doctrine, which as we have noted above Petzold identified as 
being derived from the principle of subsidiarity. The British government argued before 
the Grand Chamber that the House of Lords had failed to grant the executive and 
Parliament a sufficiently wide margin of appreciation to determine whether it was 
necessary for the applicants to be detained in order to protect the UK from international 
terrorism. The Grand Chamber responded that: 
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation has always been meant as a tool to 
define relations between the domestic authorities and the Court. It cannot have the 
same application to the relations between the organs of State at the domestic 
level.83 
Consequently, as the House of Lords had carefully examined the proportionality of the 
applicants’ detention the Grand Chamber rejected the government’s contention that 
insufficient consideration had been accorded to the opinions of the executive or 
legislature. Therefore, the Grand Chamber has made clear that the Strasbourg margin of 
appreciation doctrine is an international jurisprudential tool for demarcating State and 
Court responsibilities in the application of the Convention, not a domestic public law 
mechanism. 
 
(iii) The full-time Court’s usage post Interlaken 
It is generally appreciated that the Interlaken “High Level Conference on the Future of 
the European Court of Human” convened by the Swiss government on 18 and 19 
February 2010 at the request of  Jean-Paul Costa, the Court’s President, was designed to 
gain express political support for the Court and agreement about further reforms to the 
ECHR system from the State parties.84 The resultant Declaration and Action Plan85 gave 
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high prominence to the principle of subsidiarity. The States early in the Declaration 
stressed,  “the subsidiary nature of the supervisory mechanism established by the 
Convention and notably the fundamental role which national authorities, i.e. 
governments, courts and parliaments, must play in guaranteeing and protecting human 
rights at the national level”.86  The Conference called for “a strengthening of the principle 
of subsidiarity”.87 Furthermore, the Action Plan invited the Court to 
(a) avoid reconsidering questions of fact or national law that have been considered 
and decided by national authorities, in line with its case-law according to which it is 
not a fourth instance court;  
(b) apply uniformly and rigorously the criteria concerning admissibility and 
jurisdiction and take fully into account its subsidiary role in the interpretation and 
application of the Convention…88 
 Two years later the British government organised the Brighton Conference89 of 
State parties that resulted in the Brighton Declaration90. Again the States affirmed their 
and the Court’s shared “responsibility for realising the effective implementation of the 
Convention, underpinned by the fundamental principle of subsidiarity.”91 They welcomed 
“the development by the Court in its case law of principles such as subsidiarity and the 
margin of appreciation, and encourage[d] the Court to give great prominence to and 
apply consistently these principles in its judgments”.92 And, as we noted at the start of 
this article, the States decided that “for reasons of transparency and accessibility”93 a 
reference to the principle of subsidiarity should be added to the ECHR’s Preamble.  
 These international conferences of State parties created the contemporary 
political94 climate within which the Court now has to apply the principle of subsidiarity so 
we shall examine the jurisprudence to see if the usage has been in accordance with the 
Declarations. 
 In Austin and Others v UK95, the Grand Chamber was faced with complaints about 
the Metropolitan Police force’s controversial tactic of “kettling” demonstrators and 
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bystanders located in places where the police feared serious public disorder. Kettling 
involved the police keeping such persons within a police cordon (with many police 
officers equipped with shields and wearing protective helmets) until the police 
determined that the threat of public disorder had abated. On 1st May (May Day) 2001 the 
Metropolitan Police had been notified of two events in London and police intelligence 
indicated that other events were planned, including protests by 500-1000 “hard-core”  
demonstrators seeking violent confrontations. On the previous May Day there had been 
extensive violent protests in London. In the early afternoon of May Day 2001 the police 
decided to introduce a police cordon around people in Oxford Circus as the police feared 
the occurrence of violent protest (under domestic law the police were seeking to prevent 
a breach of the police). Up to 2,000 persons were kept within the police cordon. Over 
seven hours the police gradually allowed persons within the cordon to leave in groups. 
The four applicants, a protestor, a person who had gone to the area to buy a book and 
two local workers who were caught up in the cordon during their lunch breaks, 
unsuccessful challenged the lawfulness of their subjection to kettling  before the 
domestic courts. At Strasbourg they alleged the police had violated their right to liberty 
(Article 5 ECHR). The British government responded that, as the House of Lords had 
unanimously concluded96, the police action against the applicants had not resulted in a 
deprivation of their liberty so no breach of Article 5 had occurred. Regarding the events 
of May Day 2001 the Grand Chamber, as we have previously noted97, expressly applied 
the principle of subsidiarity to the process of fact finding. Given that the High Court 
hearing of the applicants’ case had lasted three weeks, during which six days had been 
devoted to oral evidence and the trial judge had been shown video footage of the 
incident and examined thousands of pages of evidence with his judgment containing 500 
paragraphs devoted to the evidence and his findings of fact, the Grand Chamber found 
“no ground to  depart from them”.98 A large majority of the Grand Chamber (fourteen 
votes to three) concluded,  similarly too the House of Lords, that the applicants had not 
suffered a deprivation of liberty and therefore no breach of Article 5 had occurred. The 
majority emphasised that this conclusion was “based on the specific and exceptional 
facts of this case.”99 
  Austin represents a clear example of the Grand Chamber complying with 
the Interlaken Action Plan’s invitation for the Court not to reconsider questions of fact 
decided at the national level.100 Where there has been such an extensive examination of 
the disputed facts by an independent and impartial domestic court it would not only be 
contrary to the principle of subsidiarity but a waste of the Court’s precious resources for 
the latter to try and substitute itself as the primary fact-finding tribunal. However, where 
domestic authorities have failed to engage in robust judicial fact-finding then the Court is 
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obliged to undertake that task itself. A very dramatic example of such a failure 
necessitating the Court to become the primary fact finder occurred a few months later in 
El-Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia101. This was the first occasion 
where the Court was faced with a complainant alleging that a Contracting State had 
violated the Convention through its collaboration with the United States of America’s 
secret “extraordinary rendition”102 programme instigated as a response to the 
September 2001 al’Qaeda terrorist attacks in that country.103 The German applicant 
contended that he had, inter alia, been forcibly detained by respondent State officials in 
a hotel, handed over to USA personnel in Macedonia who subjected him to torture and 
then transported him to an unacknowledged Central Intelligence Agency detention 
facility, located in a former brick works outside Kabul in Afghanistan. There he was 
subjected to harsh interrogations during four months of detention before being flown 
back to Europe and released in the Albanian countryside! The respondent government 
categorically denied the applicant’s allegations and instead claimed that Macedonian 
officials had merely checked his passport when he entered the country and that he had 
voluntarily left for Serbia three weeks later.  Whilst the Grand Chamber acknowledged 
that it was “sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and recognises that it must be 
cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not 
rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case”104, it had to take into 
account the quality of the domestic fact-finding procedures. Here the Skopje public 
prosecutor had rejected the applicant’s criminal complaint after two months, during 
which time the prosecutor had not interviewed the applicant or hotel staff nor 
investigated specified aircraft landings in the country. Also the applicant’s civil action 
against the government had been ongoing since 2009 with no judgment delivered by the 
time of the Grand Chamber proceedings. Consequently, the Grand Chamber, 
unanimously, went on to find that the respondent State had not provided a plausible 
explanation of what  had happened to the applicant and that his account, with 
supporting evidence,  was established beyond reasonable doubt. This led to 
determinations that the respondent State had, inter alia, subjected El-Masri to inhuman 
and degrading treatment during his unlawful detention in the hotel, been responsible for 
his torture by American officials at Skopje airport and breached Article 5 through 
Macedonia’s liability for his captivity in Afghanistan at the hands of the Americans. 
Therefore, El-Masri powerfully illustrates that the principle of subsidiarity, so keenly 
invoked by States during the above Conferences, imposes obligations upon Contracting 
States (in that context the need for robust domestic fact-finding) and it is not simply a 
device to constrain the Court.  
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 Another facet of the principle of subsidiarity placing duties on domestic 
authorities was highlighted by the Grand Chamber in Fabris v France105. The applicant, 
who had been formally recognised as an “illegitimate” child of a married woman by a 
domestic court, complained about his inability to enforce inheritance rights (compared to 
those of his legitimate half-siblings) alleging discrimination contrary to, inter alia, Article 
14 (prohibition of discrimination in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
(protection of property) of the ECHR. The Grand Chamber was united in holding that, 
“where an applicant’s pleas relate to the “rights and freedoms” guaranteed by the 
Convention the courts are required to examine them with particular rigour and care and 
that this is a corollary of the principle of subsidiarity”.106 Noting that the original Court 
had ruled against discrimination based upon illegitimacy decades previously107 the Grand 
Chamber was critical of the French courts’ treatment of the applicant’s inheritance claim 
due to his birth status. Consequently, the Grand Chamber found he had suffered a 
breach of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Hence, domestic 
courts should pay attention to the Court’s established jurisprudence when dealing with 
relevant claims as an element of subsidiarity. Such a requirement is fully in conformity 
with States’ express acknowledgment of their shared responsibility for the effective 
implementation of the Convention in the Brighton Declaration.108 
 The contemporary high profile of the principle of subsidiarity within the ECHR 
system was further demonstrated by thirty three Members of the European Parliament 
invoking it as a basis for their intervention in the Grand Chamber case of  Lautsi and 
Others v Italy109. The applicants, a mother and her two children, complained that the 
legal requirement for Italian state schools to display crucifixes on classroom walls 
violated their Convention rights, inter alia, including the right to education (Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 1). The MEPs argued that, “the Court was not a constitutional court and had 
to respect the principle of subsidiarity and recognise a particularly broad margin of 
appreciation in favour of Contracting States not only regarding the relationship between 
the State and religion but also where they carried out their functions in the area of 
education and teaching.”110 Finding no European consensus regarding the display of 
religious symbols in state schools the Grand Chamber went on to hold that issue fell 
within the margin of appreciation of States and Italy had not acted outside that 
discretion. Lautsi was yet another judgment disclosing the intertwined connections 
between subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation in the reasoning of the Court. 
Furthermore, the Grand Chamber revealed its reluctance to declare an established 
practice reflecting a particular State’s religious heritage as being contrary to the 
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Convention, that attitude most certainly accorded with the States’ ethos of the principle 
of subsidiarity embodied in the Interlaken and Brighton Declarations. 
 An even more recent example of the Court applying the principle of subsidiarity 
and its offspring the margin of appreciation in the context of a dispute involving religious 
beliefs was S.A.S. v France111. The applicant was a French national, who had been born 
in Pakistan and was brought up in a Sunni cultural tradition in which it was customary 
for women to wear a full-face veil in public. As a devout adult Muslim she wished, of her 
own volition, to wear a burqa (full-body covering with a mesh over the face) and niqab 
(a full-face veil with just an opening for the eyes) in public on occasions  that she chose 
(for example during Ramadan). However, in October 2010 a Law was enacted by the 
French Parliament that made it a criminal offence for persons to wear clothing designed 
to conceal their faces in public places, which were defined to include public authority 
premises such as schools and hospitals. Breach of the Law could result in a maximum 
fine of 150 euros and/or an obligation to attend a citizenship course. The Law had been 
introduced because the government, inter alia, considered that facial concealment in 
public places was contrary to the French Republican value of “fraternity” and it also fell 
below the “minimum requirement of civility that is necessary for social interaction”.112 
The Law had been enacted with only one vote against and four abstentions in the 
National Assembly and the Senate. The Constitutional Council considered, with a 
reservation regarding places of worship, that the Law was compliant with the 
Constitution. Before the Grand Chamber the applicant submitted that the Law violated 
her right to respect for her private life (regarding her desired appearance) under Article 
8 and her freedom to manifest her religious beliefs guaranteed by Article 9 of the 
Convention. The Grand Chamber found that the applicant’s complaints fell within both of 
those Articles, but the latter was given greater attention due to the applicant’s religious 
beliefs. When assessing if the Law was “necessary in a democratic society” the Grand 
Chamber noted that: 
It is also important to emphasise the fundamentally subsidiary role of the 
Convention mechanism. The national authorities have direct democratic 
legitimation and are, as the Court has held on many occasions, in principle better 
placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions. In 
matters of general policy, on which opinions within a democratic society may 
reasonably differ widely, the role of the domestic policy-maker should be given 
special weight (see, for example, Maurice v. France [GC], no. 11810/03, § 117, 
ECHR 2005-IX). This is the case, in particular, where questions concerning the 
relationship between State and religions are at stake (see, mutatis mutandis, 
Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek, cited above, § 84, and Wingrove v. the United 
Kingdom, 25 November 1996, § 58, Reports 1996-V; see also Leyla Şahin, cited 
above, § 109). As regards Article 9 of the Convention, the State should thus, in 
principle, be afforded a wide margin of appreciation in deciding whether and to 
what extent a limitation of the right to manifest one’s religion or beliefs is 
“necessary”.113 
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After emphasising that whether to ban full-face veils in public places was a “choice of 
society”114 and that the Court had to “exercise a degree of restraint”115 when reviewing 
the balance struck by the democratic process in France, a large majority of the Grand 
Chamber (fifteen votes to two) concluded that there had been no breaches of Articles 8 
or 9 of the ECHR. For the majority the respondent State could justify the restrictions 
imposed on the applicant as being for the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of 
others by preserving the French social value of “living together”. Judges Nussberger and 
Jaderblom dissented opining, in part, that the latter “concept seems far-fetched and 
vague”.116 This study is not the place to examine that dispute. However, for us the 
judgment in S.A.S. provides a striking contemporary demonstration of the Court 
following the “democracy-enhancing approach” elaborated  in Judge Spano’s article 
noted above.117 The Grand Chamber expressly acknowledged its subsidiary role and held 
that regarding issues of “general policy” the Court should recognise the primary role of 
the domestic authorities, especially where the policy had ultimately been determined by 
democratic processes. This restraint by the Court when faced with a challenge, based 
upon qualified Convention rights, to a national law that had received overwhelming 
parliamentary support certainly accorded with the Brighton Declaration’s encouragement 
for the Court to give greater prominence to both the principle of subsidiarity and margin 
of appreciation doctrine. 
 Interestingly, whilst participating in the work of the Grand Chamber Judge 
Wojtyczek, from Poland, has delivered separate opinions which articulate a view of 
subsidiarity within the domestic constitutional framework that has echoes of several of 
the conceptual views of subsidiarity outlined in the first part of our study. In the Case of 
Sindicatul Cel Bun v Romania118, the applicant trade union (“The Good Shepherd”) had 
been formed by a number of Orthodox priests and lay employees of the Romanian 
Orthodox Church. The trade union applied to the  Court of First Instance for registration 
as a trade union, but the local Archdiocese objected on the ground that the creation of a 
trade union by members of the Church required the consent of the Archbishop (which he 
had not given) in accordance with the Statute of the Church (which was approved by a 
Government Ordinance). Eventually, the Romanian courts refused to register the 
applicant. The trade union then lodged a complaint at Strasbourg alleging a breach its 
members’ right to form a trade union laid down in Article 11 of the ECHR. The Grand 
Chamber, by eleven votes to six, reversed the judgment of the Chamber (given by five 
votes to two) and found no breach of Article 11. The majority in the Grand Chamber 
determined, on the basis of a lack of a consensus amongst Contracting States, that 
States had a wide margin of appreciation to decide whether to recognise trade unions 
operating within religious communities. Whilst the Grand Chamber majority did not 
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discuss the principle of subsidiarity, the judgment focused on the Convention obligation 
of States to defer to the autonomy of their religious organisations. 
In this connection, the Court observes that it has frequently emphasised the 
State’s role as the neutral and impartial organiser of the practice of religions, faiths 
and beliefs, and has stated that this role is conducive to public order, religious 
harmony and tolerance in a democratic society, particularly between opposing 
groups... It can only confirm this position in the present case. Respect for the 
autonomy of religious communities recognised by the State implies, in particular, 
that the State should accept the right of such communities to react, in accordance 
with their own rules and interests, to any dissident movements emerging within 
them that might pose a threat to their cohesion, image or unity. It is therefore not 
the task of the national authorities to act as the arbiter between religious 
communities and the various dissident factions that exist or may emerge within 
them.119 
Judge Wojtyczek issued a concurring opinion in which he expressed his doubts about 
whether the right to form trade unions, contained in Article 11, was applicable to persons 
holding clerical office. As part of his analysis he identified the important principle 
governing the interpretation of the Convention that: 
…according to the Preamble to the Convention, fundamental freedoms are best 
maintained by an “effective political democracy”. In addition, any restrictions on 
the various freedoms safeguarded by the Convention must be “necessary in a 
democratic society”. The interpretation of the Convention must therefore have due 
regard for the democratic ideal. Among the different characteristics of a democratic 
State, the principle of State subsidiarity should not be overlooked. A democratic 
society will flourish in a subsidiary State which observes the autonomy of the 
various communities of which it is made up. Such legitimate autonomy may be 
reflected, for example, in self-regulation by means of extra-legal rules of conduct 
produced or accepted by different social groups.120 
So Judge Wojtyczek was identifying a concept of subsidiarity within the domestic 
relations between governmental bodies and other groupings in a particular society, that 
sought to place  limitations on the acceptability of the former intervening in the internal 
affairs of the latter. He traced the Convention foundations of that requirement to the 
Preamble and limitation clauses embodied in Articles 8 to 11 of the ECHR.121 These 
provisions are not commonly cited as the sources of the Court’s principle of subsidiarity, 
but Judge Wojtyczek was invoking a different intra State notion of subsidiarity which he 
then applied to interpret the Convention. His analysis also provides a more theoretical 
justification for the majority’s invocation of the idea of autonomy in church and state 
relations. 
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 Subsequently in O’Keeffee v Ireland122, Judge Wojtyczek joined four other judges 
in issuing a partly dissenting opinion which, almost verbatim, repeated his conception of 
intra State subsidiarity delivered in Sindicatul. Ms O’Keeffee, when nine years old, had 
suffered terrible sexual abuse by her head-teacher whilst attending a Roman Catholic 
owned and run school. She tried to suppress the consequences of that abuse, but over 
two decades later (after she had been contacted by the police and received counselling) 
she brought civil proceedings against her abuser and state authorities seeking 
compensation. Her abuser did not defend her claim, but the government successfully 
argued that it was not liable for her abuse. She then lodged a complaint at Strasbourg 
contending, inter alia, that the respondent State had failed to comply with its Convention 
positive obligation to protect her from Article 3 abuse by the teacher. The case was 
relinquished to the Grand Chamber. A large majority of the Grand Chamber (eleven 
votes to six) went on to conclude that Ireland had failed to comply with its positive 
obligation of protection regarding the applicant’s abuse in 1973. Judge Wojtyczek and his 
colleagues sympathised with the applicant for her suffering and agreed with the majority 
that States were under a Convention duty to take appropriate measures to protect 
children. However, they regretted that they were: 
…unable to follow the majority in their analysis and conclusions as to the scope of 
the positive obligations of the State in the circumstances of the present case. 
These positive obligations have to be construed with due consideration to the 
different values and rights protected by the Convention. According to the Preamble 
to the Convention, fundamental freedoms are best maintained in an effective 
political democracy. The notion of a democratic society encompasses the idea of 
subsidiarity. A democratic society may flourish only in a State that respects the 
principle of subsidiarity and allows the different social actors to self-regulate their 
activities. This applies also to the domain of education. Legislation pertaining to 
private education should respect the legitimate autonomy of private schools. Article 
2 of Protocol No. 1 guarantees the right of parents to ensure education and 
teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions. It is 
clear that the democratic State has to respect the education choices of the parents 
as well as the parents’ primary responsibility for the development and well-being of 
their children.123 
The dissenters further criticised the majority for retrospectively applying contemporary 
positive obligation standards to events that occurred four decades ago.124  
 In O’Keeffe we can see Judge Wojtyczek’s concept of subsidiarity being applied by 
the dissenters in the different jurisprudential area of Convention positive obligations. 
Nevertheless, there are similarities in the institutional context between Sindicatul and 
O’Keeffe as both involved the relationships between state bodies and (powerful) religious 
organisations. According to his view of subsidiarity state agencies should exercise 
restraint in their regulation of the latter whether they be controlling the activities of their 
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religious office-holders or be providing schooling. In neither case did  Judge Wojtyczek 
specify the intellectual origins of his belief that an element of a democratic society is 
state organs respecting the subsidiarity of  component communities. However, we have 
discovered that both religious125 and secular126 proponents of subsidiarity have 
advocated views that are compatible with his idea of intra State restraint by 
governmental authorities. 
(iv) Quantitative references to the principle of subsidiarity in reports of Court judgments 
Our focus has been on the Court’s evolving jurisprudential usage of the principle and 
that has involved examining the qualitative features of the principle. We can now, 
briefly, consider how frequently subsidiarity has been mentioned in reports of judgments 
of the Court.  An “advanced search” of the Court’s HUDOC database, on 25 June 2014, 
for the term “subsidiarity” in the text of Court judgments generated 240 hits.127 These 
comprised 70 Grand Chamber judgments (including two duplicate non-English/French 
language translations) and 170 Chamber judgments (including one duplicate non-
English/French language translation). Looking first at the Grand Chamber’s statistics 
they can be subdivided into the following three eras reflecting our earlier qualitative 
analysis: 
 
Era Total number of 
cases containing a 
reference to 
“subsidiarity” 
Time period Average number of 
references per year 
Post-Interlaken: 
2010 to June 2014 
29 4.5 years 6.4 
Full-time Court: 
1999 to 2009 
35 11 years 3.2 
Original Court:  
1996 to 1998 
4 3 years 1.3 
 
In regard to reports of Chamber judgments the statistics were: 
Era Total number of 
cases containing a 
reference to 
“subsidiarity” 
Time period Average number of 
references per year 
Post-Interlaken: 
2010 to June 2014 
89 4.5 years 19.8 
Full-time Court: 
1999-2009 
77 11 years 7 
Original Court: 
1992 to 1998 
3 7 years 0.43 
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Of course, it must be appreciated that the role of the Court fundamentally altered after 
Protocol No. 11 of the ECHR128 came into effect in November 1998 and subsequently the 
annual total of judgments delivered rose from 177 in 1999 to  a peak of 1,625 in 2009129 
and then declined to 916 in 2013.130 However, the figures for the post-Interlaken era 
show reports of judgments from both the Grand Chamber and Chambers containing 
noticeably higher yearly average numbers of references to subsidiarity. If we drill down 
into the reports of Grand Chamber judgments since Interlaken we can see the actors 
making those references to subsidiarity and the frequency of their references (noting 
that in some cases more than one actor referred to the principle): 
Year Applicant(s) Respondent 
State 
Third-party 
intervener(s) 
Judgment 
of the 
Court 
Concurring 
Opinion 
Dissenting 
Opinion 
2014 1   2  1 
2013   1 1 2 3 
2012 1 1  3 1 3 
2011   1 2  2 
2010  3  2 3 1 
 
 From these figures we can discern that there has not been any noticeable increase in 
the numbers of respondent States raising the principle of subsidiarity before the Grand 
Chamber since 2010. This is perhaps surprising given the strong endorsement of the 
principle at the Interlaken Conference. Interestingly, the statistics do reveal that 
dissenting judgments make as many references to the principle as are found in 
judgments of the Court. This may be explained by the simple fact that dissenting judges 
can invoke the principle as a ground for criticising the majority in a variety of situations. 
For example, in Vinter and Others v UK131, after condemning the abstract application of 
Article 3 of the ECHR by the majority Judge Villiger expressed the belief that such an 
approach did not “square easily with the principle of subsidiarity underlying the 
Convention”.132 Also where dissenters consider that controversial policy decisions, like 
the regulation of hunting, should have been left to national parliaments133 or the 
majority have failed to accord sufficient respect to the decisions of national courts134 
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they have cited the principle of  subsidiarity to underpin their disagreements with 
majority judgments. In the deeply divided Grand Chamber case of Animal Defenders 
International v UK135, five of the dissenters “[i]n the spirit of subsidiarity”136 were willing 
to consider the extensive legislative attention given to the Convention implications of the 
Bill continuing the UK’s long-established general ban on television and radio 
advertisements of a political nature. But the dissenters believed that the majority 
(comprising a bare majority of nine judges) had accorded “excessive importance” 137 to 
the domestic law-making process when finding that the ban did not infringe Article 10 of 
the ECHR. The dissenters’ view also represents a challenge to Judge Spano’s thesis 
about the Court’s refinement of the principle of subsidiarity over recent years examined 
earlier in our study.138 As he acknowledged, when commenting upon Animal Defenders 
International, “not all of the judges of my Court have the same views on these issues, 
but that is inevitable, we are after all dealing with the core nature of the institutional 
status of the Court and its future development.”139 Hence the breadth of usage by the 
Court of the principle in the case-law examined above is echoed in resort to the principle 
by dissentients. 
 
Conclusions 
From our examination of the Court’s jurisprudence we have been able to identify the 
range of ECHR Articles that have been invoked as the textual foundations of the principle 
of subsidiarity within the Convention system. These are primarily Articles 1, 13, 19 and 
35(1).140 We have also discovered that there has been a considerable degree of 
consistency in the uses of the principle throughout the three eras in the history of the 
Court identified in our study. Hence the Court has repeatedly taken a firm view on the 
need for applicants to exhaust domestic remedies before initiating proceedings at 
Strasbourg.141 Furthermore, the Court has regularly applied the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, which as we have learnt has been explained as being directly derived from the 
principle of subsidiarity.142 Indeed, Judge Spano has placed the margin of appreciation at 
the heart of his understanding of the contemporary “age of subsidiarity”.143 However, we 
have also been able to discern new uses of the principle of subsidiarity by the Court as it 
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has adapted to its amended responsibilities and changing caseload. For example, the 
principle was applied to underpin the Court’s altered stance on the application of Article 
13 to complaints about excessive delays in domestic judicial proceedings.144 
 Our study also enables us to perceive the complexities of the principle of 
subsidiarity as the jurisprudence clearly demonstrates that it has not been applied 
simply as a device to restrict the powers of the Court. As we have seen the Grand 
Chamber has invoked the principle where domestic authorities have failed to engage in 
effective fact-finding regarding complaints alleging breaches of Convention rights and 
freedoms.145 The Grand Chamber has additionally used the principle in support of its 
ruling that domestic courts must adopt a strict approach to assessing whether those 
rights and freedoms have been violated.146 These judgments disclose that the principle 
of subsidiarity under the ECHR places legal obligations on domestic authorities. This may 
surprise, and perhaps dismay, States who have been vigorously promoting the principle 
at the recent inter-governmental conferences on the ECHR with the belief that it would 
limit the authority and activities of the Court. Indeed, it is significant that both of these 
Grand Chamber judgments were delivered during the post-Interlaken era and thereby 
demonstrate that during the “age of subsidiarity” the Court has not been afraid to apply 
the principle in ways that place specific duties on domestic authorities. Such judgments 
make plain the actual responsibilities of Contracting States as the primary guarantors of 
Convention rights and freedoms which is the other dimension of the principle of 
subsidiarity. 
 Another aspect of the complexity of the principle of subsidiarity within the ECHR 
system is that, as we have ascertained, it is not only States who can benefit from its 
application. Certainly, in circumstances where the Court recognises that a respondent 
State has a wide margin of appreciation that requires a corresponding degree of 
deference by the Court to the domestic policy-making process, especially where 
extensive parliamentary debate about the contested measure has occurred, the 
respondent State thereby gains the direct benefit that it is much less likely to be found in 
breach of the Convention.147 States may also be helped by the Court identifying systemic 
failings in domestic administrative schemes or legislative programmes via the pilot 
judgment process, which has been linked to the principle of subsidiarity.148 Furthermore, 
the many victims of such systemic failures can also be advantaged by the utilisation of 
the pilot judgment process along with the Committee of Ministers when undertaking its 
supervision of the execution of judgments.149 We have also encountered different 
scenarios in which the application of the principle of subsidiarity helps the Court, 
including avoiding the need for the Court to provide definitive rulings on questions of 
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national law150 or determine disputed question of fact151.  Consequently, the use of the 
principle of subsidiarity within the ECHR system can offer benefits to all the various 
actors in the Strasbourg process. Of course, not all the actors will always benefit by the 
application of the principle in every case, for example where the Court recognises a 
respondent State as having a wide margin of appreciation the applicant will inevitably 
find it much more difficult to establish a violation of the Convention. Nevertheless, the 
utilisation of the principle is not always a zero-sum game between applicants and 
respondent States as, for example, our previous discussion of pilot judgments has 
highlighted. 
 Our examination of some of the quantitative features of the principle’s occurrence 
within the text of reports of Court judgments provided us with further insights into the 
complications associated with the utilisation of subsidiarity in Strasbourg proceedings. 
There was a noticeable increase in the yearly average numbers of references to 
subsidiarity in reports from both Chambers and the Grand Chamber during the post-
Interlaken period compared to throughout the first decade of the full-time Court’s work.  
This provided extra credence to the post-Interlaken period being described as the “age 
of subsidiarity”. However, it was rather surprising to see how few references respondent 
States made to subsidiarity in their reported submissions to the Grand Chamber in the 
post-Interlaken years, given the attention we have noted they lavished on the principle 
in the Interlaken and Brighton Conferences/Declarations. We also discovered that in 
contemporary times Grand Chamber dissenters were as likely to make reference to, and 
use, subsidiarity as the majority. 
 When we compared the Court’s jurisprudence on the principle of subsidiarity with 
the wider philosophical, and religious, views of the concept of subsidiarity we found that 
it was Judge Wojtyczek’s notion of an intra-State idea of subsidiarity that had the 
greatest similarities. This may, in large part, be explained by the fact that most of the 
theorists were focussed on national constitutional/governmental structures and 
activities, not the allocation of powers within a regional human rights jurisdiction 
encompassing forty seven sovereign States. Therefore, as Follesdal predicted152, the 
principle of subsidiarity is not the ultimate solution to the question of how power should 
be distributed between the Court and Contracting States. Nevertheless, it is, as we have 
discerned, a long-standing and fundamental jurisprudential tool in the decision-making 
of the Court. 
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